Valid logical sequence is not devised but only observed by man
And yet the validity of logical sequences is not a thing devised
by men, but is observed and noted by them that they may be able
to learn and teach it; for it exists eternally in the reason
of things, and has its origin with God. For as the man who narrates
the order of events does not himself create that order; and as
he who describes the situations of places, or the natures of
animals, or roots, or minerals, does not describe arrangements
of man; and as he who points out the stars and their movements
does not point out anything that he himself or any other man
has ordained; -- in the same way, he who says, "When the
consequent is false, the antecedent must also be false,"
says what is most true; but he does not himself make it so, he
only points out that it is so. And it is upon this rule that
the reasoning I have quoted from the Apostle Paul proceeds. For
the antecedent is, "There is no resurrection of the dead,"
the position taken up by those whose error the apostle wished
to overthrow. Next
, from this antecedent, the assertion, viz.,
that there is no resurrection of the dead, the necessary consequence
is, "Then Christ is not risen." But this consequence
is false, for Christ has risen; therefore the antecedent is also
false. But the antecedent is, that there is no resurrection of
the dead. We conclude, therefore, that there is a resurrection
of the dead. Now all this is briefly expressed thus: If there
is no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen; but
Christ is risen, therefore there is a resurrection of the dead.
This rule, then, that when the consequent is removed, the antecedent
must also be removed, is not made by man, but only pointed out
by him. And this rule has reference to the validity of the reasoning,
not to the truth of the statements.
False inferences may be drawn from valid seasonings, and vice
versa
In this passage, however, where the argument is about the resurrection,
both the law of the inference is valid, and the conclusion arrived
at is true. But in the case of false conclusions, too, there
is a validity of inference in some such way as the following.
Let us suppose some man to have admitted: If a snail is an animal,
it has a voice. This being admitted, then, when it has been proved
that the snail has no voice, it follows (since when the consequent
is proved false, the antecedent is also false) that the snail
is not an animal. Now this conclusion is false, but it is a true
and valid inference from the false admission. Thus, the truth
of a statement stands on its own merits; the validity of an inference
depends on the statement or the admission of the man with whom
one is arguing. And thus, as I said above, a false inference
may be drawn by a valid process of reasoning, in order that he
whose error we wish to correct may be sorry that he has admitted
the antecedent, when he sees that its logical consequences are
utterly untenable. And hence it is easy to understand that as
the inferences may be valid where the opinions are false, so
the inferences may be unsound where the opinions are true. For
example, suppose that a man propounds the statement, "If
this man is just, he is good," and we admit its truth. Then
he adds, "But he is not just;" and when we admit this
too, he draws the conclusion, "Therefore he is not good."
Now although every one of these statements may be true, still
the principle of the inference is unsound. For it is not true
that, as when the consequent is proved false the antecedent is
also false, so when the antecedent is proved false the consequent
is false. For the statement is true, "If he is an orator,
he is a man." But if we add, "He is not an orator,"
the consequence does not follow, "He is not a man."
It is one thing to know the laws of inference, another to know
the truth of opinions
Therefore it is one thing to know the laws of inference, and
another to know the truth of opinions. In the former case we
learn what is consequent, what is inconsequent, and what is incompatible.
An example of a consequent is, "If he is an orator, he is
a man;" of an inconsequent, "If he is a man, he is
an orator;" of an incompatible, "If he is a man, he
is a quadruped." In these instances we judge of the connection.
In regard to the truth of opinions, however, we must consider
propositions as they stand by themselves, and not in their connection
with one another; but when propositions that we are not sure
about are joined by a valid inference to propositions that are
true and certain, they themselves, too, necessarily become certain.
Now some, when they have ascertained the validity of the inference,
plume themselves as if this involved also the truth of the propositions.
Many, again, who hold the true opinions have an unfounded contempt
for themselves, because they are ignorant of the laws of inference;
whereas the man who knows that there is a resurrection of the
dead is assuredly better than the man who only knows that it
follows that if there is no resurrection of the dead, then is
Christ not risen.
The science of definition is not false, though it may be applied
to falsities
Again, the science of definition, of division, and of partition,
although it is frequently applied to falsities, is not itself
false, nor framed by man's device, but is evolved from the reason
of things. For although poets have applied it to their fictions,
and false philosophers, or even heretics -- that is, false Christians
-- to their erroneous doctrines, that is no reason why it should
be false, for example, that neither in definition, nor in division,
nor in partition, is anything to be included that does not pertain
to the matter in hand, nor anything to be omitted that does.
This is true, even though the things to be defined or divided
are not true. For even falsehood itself is defined when we say
that falsehood is the declaration of a state of things which
is not as we declare it to be; and this definition is true, although
falsehood itself cannot be true. We can also divide it, saying
that there are two kinds of falsehood, one in regard to things
that cannot be true at all, the other in regard to things that
are not, though it is possible they might be, true. For example,
the man who says that seven and three are eleven, says what cannot
be true under any circumstances; but he who says that it rained
on the kalends of January, although perhaps the fact is not so,
says what possibly might have been. The definition and division,
therefore, of what is false may be perfectly true, although what
is false cannot, of course, itself be true.
The rules of eloquence are true,
though sometimes used to persuade men of what is false
There are also certain rules for a more copious kind of argument,
which is called eloquence, and these rules are not the less true
that they can be used for persuading men of what is false; but
as they can be used to enforce the truth as well, it is not the
faculty itself that is to be blamed, but the perversity of those
who put it to a bad use. Nor is it owing to an arrangement among
men that the expression of affection conciliates the hearer,
or that a narrative, when it is short and clear, is effective,
and that variety arrests men's attention without wearying them.
And it is the same with other directions of the same kind, which,
whether the cause in which they are used be true or false, are
themselves true just in so far as they are effective in producing
knowledge or belief, or in moving men's minds to desire and aversion.
And men rather found out that these things are so, than arranged
that they should be so.
Use of rhetoric and dialectic
This art, however, when it is learnt, is not to be used so much
for ascertaining the meaning as for setting forth the meaning
when it is ascertained. But the art previously spoken of, which
deals with inferences, and definitions, and divisions, is of
the greatest assistance in the discovery of the meaning, provided
only that men do not fall into the error of supposing that when
they have learnt these things they have learnt the true secret
of a happy life. Still, it sometimes happens that men find less
difficulty in attaining the object for the sake of which these
sciences are learnt, than in going through the very intricate
and thorny discipline of such rules. It is just as if a man wishing
to give rules for walking should warn you not to lift the hinder
foot before you set down the front one, and then should describe
minutely the way you ought to move the hinges of the joints and
knees. For what he says is true, and one cannot walk in any other
way; but men find it easier to walk by executing these movements
than to attend to them while they are going through them, or
to understand when they are told about them. Those, on the other
hand, who cannot walk, care still less about such directions,
as they cannot prove them by making trial of them. And in the
same way a clever man often sees that an inference is unsound
more quickly than he apprehends the rules for it. A dull man,
on the other hand, does not see the unsoundness, but much less
does he grasp the rules. And in regard to all these laws, we
derive more pleasure from them as exhibitions of truth, than
assistance in arguing or forming opinions, except perhaps that
they put the intellect in better training. We must take care,
however, that they do not at the same time make it more inclined
to mischief or vanity, -- that is to say, that they do not give
those who have learnt them an inclination to lead people astray
by plausible speech and catching questions, or make them think
that they have attained some great thing that gives them an advantage
over the good and innocent.
The science of numbers not created, but only discovered, by man
Coming now to the science of number, it is clear to the dullest
apprehension that this was not created by man, but was discovered
by investigation. For, though Virgil could at his own pleasure
make the first syllable of Italia long, while the ancients pronounced
it short, it is not in any man's power to determine at his pleasure
that three times three are not nine, or do not make a square,
or are not the triple of three, nor one and a half times the
number six, or that it is not true that they are not the double
of any number because odd numbers have no half. Whether, then,
numbers are considered in themselves, or as applied to the laws
of figures, or of sounds, or of other motions, they have fixed
laws which were not made by man, but which the acuteness of ingenious
men brought to light. The man. however. who puts so high a value
on these things as to be inclined to boast himself one of the
learned, and who does not rather inquire after the source from
which those things which he perceives to be true derive their
truth, and from which those others which he perceives to be unchangeable
also derive their truth and unchangeableness, and who, mounting
up from bodily appearances to the mind of man, and finding that
it too is changeable (for it is sometimes instructed, at other
times uninstructed), although it holds a middle place between
the unchangeable truth above it and the changeable things beneath
it, does not strive to make all things redound to the praise
and love of the one God from whom he knows that all things have
their being; -- the man, I say, who acts in this way may seem
to be learned, but wise he cannot in any sense be deemed.
To which of the above-mentioned studies attention should be given,
and in what spirit
Accordingly, I think that it is well to warn studious and able
young men, who fear God and are seeking for happiness of life,
not to venture heedlessly upon the pursuit of the branches of
learning that are in vogue beyond the pale of the Church of Christ,
as if these could secure for them the happiness they seek; but
soberly and carefully to discriminate among them. And if they
find any of those which have been instituted by men varying by
reason of the varying pleasure of their founders, and unknown
by reason of erroneous conjectures, especially if they involve
entering into fellowship with devils by means of leagues and
covenants about signs, let these he utterly rejected and held
in detestation. Let the young men also withdraw their attention
from such institutions of men as are unnecessary and luxurious.
But for the sake of the necessities of this life we must not
neglect the arrangements of men that enable us to carry on intercourse
with those around us. I think, however, there is nothing useful
in the other branches of learning that are found among the heathen,
except information about objects, either past or present, that
relate to the bodily senses, in which are included also the experiments
and conclusions of the useful mechanical arts, except also the
sciences of reasoning and of number. And in regard to all these
we must hold by the maxim, "Not too much of anything;"
especially in the case of those which, pertaining as they do
to the senses, are subject to the relations of space and time.
What, then, some men have done in regard to all words and names
found in Scripture, in the Hebrew, and Syrian, and Egyptian,
and other tongues, taking up and interpreting separately such
as were left in Scripture without interpretation; and what Eusebius
has done in regard to the history of the past with a view to
the questions arising in Scripture that require a knowledge of
history for their solution; -- what, I say, these men have done
in regard to matters of this kind, making it unnecessary for
the Christian to spend his strength on many subjects for the
sake of a few items of knowledge, the same, I think, might be
done in regard to other matters, if any competent man were willing
in a spirit of benevolence to undertake the labour for the advantage
of his brethren. In this way he might arrange in their several
classes, and give an account of the unknown places, and animals,
and plants, and trees, and stones, and metals, and other species
of things that are mentioned in Scripture, taking up these only,
and committing his account to writing. This might also be done
in relation to numbers, so that the theory of those numbers,
and those only, which are mentioned in Holy Scripture, might
be explained and written down. And it may happen that some or
all of these things have been done already (as I have found that
many things I had no notion of have been worked out and committed
to writing by good and learned Christians), but are either lost
amid the crowds of the careless, or are kept out of sight by
the envious. And I am not sure whether the same thing can be
done in regard to the theory of reasoning; but it seems to me
it cannot, because this runs like a system of nerves through
the whole structure of Scripture, and on that account is of more
service to the reader in disentangling and explaining ambiguous
passages, of which I shall speak hereafter, than in ascertaining
the meaning of unknown signs, the topic I am now discussing.
Whatever has been rightly said by the heathen, we must appropriate
to our uses
Moreover, if those who are called philosophers, and especially
the Platonists, have said aught that is true and in harmony with
our faith, we are not only not to shrink from it, but to claim
it for our own use from those who have unlawful possession of
it. For, as the Egyptians had not only the idols and heavy burdens
which the people of Israel hated and fled from, but also vessels
and ornaments of gold and silver, and garments, which the same
people when going out of Egypt appropriated to themselves, designing
them for a better use, not doing this on their own authority,
but by the command of God, the Egyptians themselves, in their
ignorance, providing them with things which they themselves,
were not making a good use of; in the same way all branches of
heathen learning have not only false and superstitious fancies
and heavy burdens of unnecessary toil, which every one of us,
when going out under the leadership of Christ from the fellowship
of the heathen, ought to abhor and avoid; but they contain also
liberal instruction which is better adapted to the use of the
truth, and some most excellent precepts of morality; and some
truths in regard even to the worship of the One God are found
among them. Now these are, so to speak, their gold and silver,
which they did not create themselves, but dug out of the mines
of God's providence which are everywhere scattered abroad, and
are perversely and unlawfully prostituting to the worship of
devils. These, therefore, the Christian, when he separates himself
in spirit from the miserable fellowship of these men, ought to
take away from them, and to devote to their proper use in preaching
the gospel. Their garments, also, -- that is, human institutions
such as are adapted to that intercourse with men which is indispensable
in this life, -- we must take and turn to a Christian use. 61.
And what else have many good and faithful men among our brethren
done? Do we not see with what a quantity of gold and silver and
garments Cyprian, that most persuasive teacher and most blessed
martyr, was loaded when he came out of Egypt? How much Lactantius
brought with him? And Victorious, and Optatus, and Hilary, not
to speak of living men! How much Greeks out of number have borrowed!
And prior to all these, that most faithful servant of God, Moses,
had done the same thing; for of him it is written that he was
learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians. And to none of all
these would heathen superstition (especially in those times when,
kicking against the yoke of Christ, it was persecuting the Christians)
have ever furnished branches of knowledge it held useful, if
it had suspected they were about to turn them to the use of worshipping
the One God, and thereby overturning the vain worship of idols.
But they gave their gold and their silver and their garments
to the people of God as they were going out of Egypt, not knowing
how the things they gave would be turned to the service of Christ.
For what was done at the time of the exodus was no doubt a type
prefiguring what happens now. And this I say without prejudice
to any other interpretation that may be as good, or better.
What kind of spirit is required for the study of Holy Scripture
But when the student of the Holy Scriptures, prepared in the
way I have indicated, shall enter upon his investigations, let
him constantly meditate upon that saying of the apostle's, "Knowledge
puffeth up, but charity edifieth." For so he will feel that,
whatever may be the riches he brings with him out of Egypt, yet
unless he has kept the Passover, he cannot be safe. Now Christ
is our Passover sacrificed for us, and there is nothing the sacrifice
of Christ more clearly teaches us than the call which He himself
addresses to those whom He sees toiling in Egypt under Pharaoh:
"Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and
I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me;
for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto
your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light."
To whom is it light but to the meek and lowly in heart, whom
knowledge does not puff up, but charity edifieth? Let them remember,
then, that those who celebrated the Passover at that time in
type and shadow, when they were ordered to mark their door-posts
with the blood of the lamb, used hyssop to mark them with. Now
this is a meek and lowly herb, and yet nothing is stronger and
more penetrating than its roots; that being rooted and grounded
in love, we may be able to comprehend with all saints what is
the breadth, and length, and depth, and height, -- that is, to
comprehend the cross of our Lord, the breadth of which is indicated
by the transverse wood on which the hands are stretched, its
length by the part from the ground up to the crossbar on which
the whole body from the head downwards is fixed, its height by
the part from the crossbar to the top on which the head lies,
and its depth by the part which is hidden, being fixed in the
earth. And by this sign of the cross all Christian action is
symbolized, viz., to do good works in Christ, to cling with constancy
to Him, to hope for heaven, and not to desecrate the sacraments.
And purified by this Christian action, we shall be able to know
even "the love of Christ which passeth knowledge,"
who is equal to the Father, by whom all things, were made, "that
we may be filled with all the fullness of God." There is
besides in hyssop a purgative virtue, that the breast may not
be swollen with that knowledge which puffeth up, nor boast vainly
of the riches brought out from Egypt. "Purge me with hyssop,"
the psalmist says, "and I shall be clean; wash me, and I
shall be whiter than snow. Make me to hear joy and gladness."
Then he immediately adds, to show that it is purifying from pride
that is indicated by hyssop, "that the bones which Thou
hast broken may rejoice."
Sacred Scripture compared with
profane authors
But just as poor as the store of gold and silver and garments
which the people of Israel brought with them out of Egypt was
in comparison with the riches which they afterwards attained
at Jerusalem, and which reached their height in the reign of
King Solomon, so poor is all the useful knowledge which is gathered
from the books of the heathen when compared with the knowledge
of Holy Scripture. For whatever man may have learnt from other
sources, if it is hurtful, it is there condemned; if it is useful,
it is therein contained. And while every man may find there all
that he has learnt of useful elsewhere, he will find there in
much greater abundance things that are to be found nowhere else,
but can be learnt only in the wonderful sublimity and wonderful
simplicity of the Scriptures. When, then, the reader is possessed
of the instruction here pointed out, so that unknown signs have
ceased to be a hindrance to him; when he is meek and lowly of
heart, subject to the easy yoke of Christ, and loaded with His
light burden, rooted and grounded and built up in faith, so that
knowledge cannot puff him up, let him then approach the consideration
and discussion of ambiguous signs in Scripture. And about these
I shall now, in a third book, endeavour to say what the Lord
shall be pleased to vouchsafe.